Hermenēus
Revista de traducción e interpretación

EDICIONES Universidad Valladolid

A semiotic construction of modern myth: An insight from Translation Studies

La construcción semiótica del mito moderno: una perspectiva desde la Traductología

YE TIAN
University of Hong Kong. School of Chinese. Centennial Campus (Room 9.48, Run Run Tower). Pokfulam Road. Hong Kong, China.
Dirección de correo electrónico: yetian-translation@hku.hk
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4591-272X
Recibido/Received: 9/9/2025. Aceptado/Accepted: 7/7/2026.
Cómo citar / How to cite: Tian, Ye, «A semiotic construction of modern myth: An insight from Translation Studies», *Hermēneus. Revista de Traducción e Interpretación*, 28 (2026): pp. 441-469.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.24197/7yke0686

Artículo de acceso abierto distribuido bajo una Licencia Creative Commons Atribución 4.0 Internacional (CC-BY 4.0). / Open access article under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (CC-BY 4.0).

Abstract: This article proposes interdisciplinary research on the links between reality, semiotics, and translation by analyzing modern myths. When mythology is a structural and semiotic way of reading social reality, translation, which develops its root in the meaning-making mechanism of signs, lies at the core of the semiosis process of myth construction and interpretation. By comparing the architectural representations of China and Ireland on a poster, the article discusses different structures of myths and uses the Chinese representation as a case to explore the research questions, namely: How are myths constructed? What is the role of translation in revealing the process where social reality is coded as a myth? By answering these questions, this article wishes to highlight the translational core of the semiotic mythological structure.
Keywords: Mythology; reality; semiotics; translation.
Resumen: Este artículo propone una investigación interdisciplinaria sobre los vínculos entre la realidad, la semiótica y la traducción a través del análisis de los mitos modernos. Cuando la mitología es una forma estructural y semiótica de leer la realidad social, la traducción, que hunde sus raíces en el mecanismo de creación de significado de los signos, se sitúa en el núcleo del proceso de semiosis de la construcción e interpretación del mito. Mediante la comparación de las representaciones arquitectónicas de China e Irlanda en un cartel, el artículo analiza las diferentes estructuras de los mitos y utiliza la representación china como caso de estudio para explorar las preguntas de investigación, a saber: ¿Cómo se construyen los mitos? ¿Cuál es el papel de la traducción en la revelación del proceso por el cual la realidad social se codifica como mito? Al responder a estas preguntas, este artículo busca destacar el núcleo traslativo de la estructura mitológica semiótica.
Palabras clave: Mitología; realidad; semiótica; traducción.

Summary: 1. Introduction; 2. Towards a Semiotic Translation Theory; 3. Mythology: From Not-real Representation to Not-fake Representation, 3.1 Not-real Mythology, 3.2 Not-fake Mythology: Myths Today; 4. Mythology and Signs, 4.1 A Semiology Structure: Saussure, Hjelmslev, and Barthes, 4.2 Semiotic Mythology: From Peirce to Eco; 5. Representation, Myth, and Translation; 6. Iconic and Symbolic Construction of Myths, 6.1 Icon-to-Symbol Myth, 6.2 Symbol as Modern Myth; 7. Myth as Translating Reality; 8. Conclusion; References.
Sumario: 1. Introducción; 2. Hacia una teoría semiótica de la traducción; 3. Mitología: de la representación no-real a la representación no-falsa, 3.1 Mitología no-real, 3.2 Mitología no-falsa: los mitos hoy; 4. Mitología y signos, 4.1 Una estructura semiológica: Saussure, Hjelmslev y Barthes, 4.2 Mitología semiótica: de Peirce a Eco; 5. Representación, mito y traducción; 6. Construcción icónica y simbólica de los mitos, 6.1 El mito de icono a símbolo, 6.2 El símbolo como mito moderno; 7. El mito como traducción de la realidad; 8. Conclusión; Referencias bibliográficas.

1. INTRODUCTION

This article draws on discussions of mythology to establish links between representation, interpretation, and translation. It follows Roland Barthes's (1915-1980) (2009) early passion in his development of his book *Mythologies*, in which he states, «I wanted to track down, in the decorative display of *what-goes-without-saying*, the ideological abuse which, in my view, is hidden (in everyday cultural life)» (Barthes, 2009, p. 10). In other words, this article examines everyday cultural life in translation from a semiotic perspective.

Translation Studies scholars, from Dinda Gorlée (1994) to Kobus Marais (2018), construct the process of translation as semiosis, the process of meaning-making of signs. In this process, other scholars, including Maria Tymoczko (2007) and Edwin Gentzler's (2007), constantly revisit the interplay between translatory power and ideology. Worth exploring still is how translation can work as an analytical or critical tool that, on the one hand, helps construct social reality through historical and ideological frameworks, and, on the other hand, reveals such hidden ideological agendas in our everyday experience. In other words, we do not only use interdisciplinary methods to look at translation but use translation as an interdisciplinary method to look at our lives. Barthes's analysis on mythology helps to foreground such a role of translation.

Therefore, beyond interlinking semiotics and translation, this article proposes a central hypothesis: the semiotic structure of modern myth is inherently translational. Translation is not merely a tool for decoding myths *after* they are formed; rather, the construction of myth is an act of translation itself. To test this, I will first review the semiological and

semiotic[1] structures of myth, arguing that their mechanism of emptying and refilling aligns with the hermeneutic model of translational process. Following this, the case study of a visual poster will be examined to demonstrate how iconicity and symbolicity are translated into ideological representations. By doing so, this article aims to clarify both *how* myths are constructed and *why* translation serves as the critical lens to reveal their hidden histories.

2. TOWARDS A SEMIOTIC TRANSLATION THEORY

Translation Studies, as readers may already be aware, has its semiological and semiotic roots in Roman Jakobson's (1959) model of translation. However, more recent developments in the discipline show how Translation Studies have moved beyond Jakobson, especially his emphasis on translation proper, namely, interlingual translation. Dinda Gorlée (1994), for example, identifies the lack of earlier attempts to establish an interdisciplinary research agenda between semiotics and translation, while her own research focuses less on the «narrow sense» translation, i.e., «logocentric approach» (Gorlée, 1994, p. 12). Rather, by drawing inspirations from Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914), Gorlée stretches the domain of Translation Studies «beyond the exclusively linguistic» one, and therefore «(addressing) adequately Jakobson's all *three* types of translation», which, in the footnote, Gorlée still believes to be «still rather narrowly defined» (ibid., italics original). If Gorlée marks one of the starting points for modern translation discipline to go on a semiotic route, then, more recently, Kobus Marais continues to make breakthroughs. In his criticism of Gorlée, Marais (2018, p. 50) identifies how Gorlée's explorations, for one thing, «limits her thought to the linguistic bias by trying to establish a link between Peircean thought and Wittgenstein's language games». Instead, Marais provides a biosemiotic translation paradigm, in which he, like Gorlée, builds upon Peirce's semiotics throughout the book, leading the discipline further away from Jakobson and a focus on language. Semiotic-informed Translation Studies

[1] As I will explain in later sections, I use semiology to refer to the sign study tradition represented by Saussure and semiotics to that by Peirce. The distinction here is mainly for the purpose of clarity, because, as argued by Anna Maria Lorusso (2015, p. 3), «there is no advantage in setting out semiotics and semiology as two opposing factions» anymore in today's semiotic research landscape.

is one of the foundational underpinnings of this research. In the later analytical sections, I will return to Gorlée and Marais for more detailed contributions they made, and I take advantage of them in developing my arguments.

Another line of research highlights the role of translation in shaping and resisting ideologies. Early developments in this aspect of research include Maria Tymoczko's (2007) call for *Enlarging Translation, Empowering Translators* (her book title). She believes that translators have the power in shaping and resisting ideologies in postcolonial societies and beyond, and ideology in particular «is intertwined with the translation of culture because cultural translation is a prime means of activist translation, affirming identity and autonomy, and claiming or decentering power» (Tymoczko, 2007, p. 255). Region-specific research projects reveal the similar patterns of the parallel between ideology and translation, for example, Edwin Gentzler's (2007) exploration on how Americans use translation to resist the hegemonic ideology of English. Translated texts of specific genre also catch researchers' attention, while the most significant text type for translation and ideological struggle is news and journalism (see, for example, Azodi, 2016).

These projects mostly focus on translation within what Marais calls a «language bias», but more research in and out of Translation Studies focus on broader scope. Archaeological research by Mark Pizzato (2024), for example, reveals the religious ideology translated by what he terms *European Churches and Chinese Temples as Neuro-Theatrical Sites* (his book title) Although Pizzato is not a Translation Studies scholar, he nevertheless borrows translational terms, especially in Chapter 3, to describe the phenomenon of «super-natural translations» (Pizzato, 2024, p. 175), which he argues that «European churches are built around translated relics or upon mythic, yet contested sites, as are Chinese temples» (ibid., 178). Here translation is used in a more material, and arguably semiotic, sense rather than the narrower, linguistic one, as similarly explored by Piotr Blumczynski (2023, p. 83), who himself from Translation Studies discipline, with a focus on holy bones.

Built on these strands of disciplinary developments, there are dual purposes for using mythology as an inquiry in my current study. On the one hand, mythology is closely linked with signs, that they are not simply read as stories for the sake of stories, but different semiologists reveal different structures within them, as we will review in the next section. The complexity of the semiosis involved in decoding myths means that the

deeply rooted features of translation in semiology and semiotics, as highlighted by the likes of Gorlée and Marais, lies at the core of myth construction and interpretation; on the other hand, as we will examine more closely, myths today reveals the historical and ideological agendas hidden in our everyday life. Following Barthes' agenda of demystifying our cultural lives, this research shows that, although they rarely use the term, translation is the very weapon that Barthes and his followers take to reveal hidden history and ideology.

3. MYTHOLOGY: FROM NOT-REAL PRESENTATION TO NOT-FAKE REPRESENTATION

In this section, I propose a binary between not-real and not-fake representation for analytical purposes. I deliberately use negative noun phrases as tags. As will be seen later, not-real does not necessarily mean fake, and not-fake does not necessarily mean true. I will elaborate on what the tags mean in the following sections, but a very short distinction can be made from the start: the not-real representation contains binary thinking between mythological world and the logical, contemporary (non-mythological) world, while the not-fake representation goes beyond the binary and focuses more on «myths today», as Barthes calls it.

3.1. Not-real mythology

The not-real label represents a traditional semiological way of approaching myths, that is, seeing mythological world as opposed to modernity. One of the typical comparison between the two worlds can be seen in Jurij Lotman and Boris Uspenskij's (1978) analysis, in which they state that the mythological description, or «metalanguage», is «fundamentally monolinguistic» while the nonmythological description, or «metatext», is «definitely polylinguistic» (Lotman and Uspenskij, 1978, p. 212). The oppositive positions between mythologism and non-mythologism put translation at the very heart of the latter while the former becomes more relevant to «the *transformation* of objects» (ibid., italics original), while the former is believed to be untranslatable (Lotman and Uspensky, 1978, p. 219). Although the paper focuses more on the not-fake mythology that will be elaborated on in the next section, the classic mythological analysis contributes an overall methodology that draws

inspiration from Saussurean semiology, which is important for our later explorations. Therefore, a short review is provided in this section.

As stated above, mythology is often analyzed from the perspective of semiology. Claude Lévi-Strauss (1908-2009) (1963) sees myth as similar to the semiological structure of language. In his theory, myth is a language that is not true, the opposite of history or, more precisely, «a history without archives, there being of course no written documents» (2001, p. 16), as well as being «highly repetitive» (ibid., 17). In order to understand myth, Lévi-Strauss argues (1963, p. 210), the semiology system must be borrowed from Ferdinand de Saussure (1857-1913) and applied to its analysis. There is «the event» and «the pattern» within a myth. The event belongs to the past, while the pattern is timeless. These two elements of a myth make it a kind of language but with a third level that is distinct from parole and langue and, therefore, more complex than language. In order to analyze this more complex semiotic system, Lévi-Strauss uses the concept of gross constituent units (1963, p. 211) to talk about myth: while language is analyzed at the level of phonemes, morphemes, and sememes, myth is analyzed at the level of gross constituent units – the «mythemes» (idem) – in order to uncover the relation that hides in a myth. Like an orchestra score, it is «impossible to understand a myth as a continuous sequence» (2001, p. 20); gross constituent units allow a myth to be analyzed sentence by sentence, diachronically as well as synchronically, regardless how many different versions there are and how authentic each version is, in order to understand «the functioning of the mechanical toy which he is trying to sell to the on-lookers» (p. 213).

Analyzing myths like this, Lévi-Strauss «had in mind this tendency of myths to become purely syntagmatic, *a-semantic* texts, not records of particular events, but Schemas for organizing messages» (Lotman, 1990, p. 34). In other words, although there is a similarity between language-as-a-sign and mythology-as-a-sign, the two systems work differently – myth as «metatext, that is, a text that fulfills a metalinguistic function with respect to what is given» and non-myth as «metalanguage», again the binary summarized by Lotman and Upensky (1978, p. 212).

Relatedly, Ernst Cassirer's (1974-1945) (1946) research is another example where the similarity between *Language and Myth*, which is the title of his seminal book, is revealed. Interpreting mythical ideas as religious, Cassirer illustrates how linguistic concepts are like mythical thoughts. To avoid self-dissolution, instead of regarding myth as the duplication of truth, he claims that people must view this intellectual form

as «an original way and tendency of expression, which is more than a mere record of something initially given in fixed categories of real existence». Or, in other words, «myth, art, language and science appear as symbols» (Cassirer 1946, p. 8). Cassirer (ibid., p. 28) realizes that naming lies at the core of mythologies, which «transforms the world of sense impression, which animals also possess, into a mental world, a world of ideas and meanings», and the same approach can be applied to a mythical image, as it is within that image that god «lives on by a law of its own, and has gained form and continuity» (ibid., p. 35). Be it a semiological structure, naming, or pure-names, as the core of mythologies work, again, differently from how language works in today's society, because naming reveals «particular clearness the mythologism of thinking, since the action is not abstracted from the object, but is integrated with the performer and can generally function as the state of the proper name» (Lotman and Uspensky, 1978, p. 218).

In both cases, mechanisms of myth operate in the «inner» world, making myth a sign but also «the pure signifier to a single being» (Derrida 1985, 166) – but here, I will not dive into Derrida's discussion of translation and the pure name of «Des Tours de Babel» despite its relevance to Translation Studies. I hope, however, that the above analysis has shown the rationale for referring to the mythologies examined in this section as not real: there is a methodological distinction between mythologism and non-mythologism. While Lévi-Strauss spent much of his time exploring Oedipus, Cassirer explores God, but tagging these myths as not-real does not necessarily mean they are fake, but emphasizes the differences to the contemporary, logical thinking: they reveal the *patterns* of culture in a semiological way, and that Oedipus's story, for example, continues to reflect our 'id' (see Freud, 1925). In short, myths that are not-real «are not … detached stories. They are imaginative *patterns, networks of powerful symbols* that suggest particular ways of interacting with the world» (Midgley, 2003, p. 1, italics original).

3.2. Not-fake mythology: myths today

Consider these cases: a sentence in a Latin textbook, showcasing the grammar rather than expressing literal meaning; a black soldier solute to the French national flag. Both examples are raised by Barthes (2009, p. 139) as what he calls «myths today», who points out that the perception of myth as a fake tale is largely a misuse of the concept. Barthes (2009, p. 10)

acknowledges that there is a shift in his interest from «'myth' in its traditional sense» to «phenomena apparently most unlike literature», and the main cause for this shift comes from «a feeling of impatience at the sight of the 'naturalness' with which newspapers, art and common sense constantly dress up a reality which, even though it is the one we live in, is undoubtedly determined by history». To analyze modern French life and reveal the history hidden beneath the naturalness, Barthes (2009, p. 10) develops mythology «in a methodical fashion».

This does not mean a total turning away from the not-real mythology earlier. As Lévi-Strauss states (1963, 209), in order «to be known, myth has to be told», thereby making myth «speech». As Lévi-Strauss (idem) and Barthes (2009, p. 131) point out, people assign «historical limits» and «reintroduce society» (ibid.) to such speech. Richard Howells (1999, p. 155) explores the myth of the *Titanic*, a modern tragedy about not only a ship, but about «the perceived relationship between man, God, nature and technology». More recently, Pete Benett and Julian McDougall (2013) edited a volume, *Barthes'* Mythologies *Today*, claiming to «turn our gaze to 'Myth Today', getting inside Barthes so we can speak to myth – to reimagine from the vantage point of looking away from and at its 'perceptible absence'» (Benett and McDougall, 2013, p. 4). The edited volume sees the interpretation of myths ranging from education to a passport, from the British TV show *Top Gear* to international sports competitions. Imitating Barthes's (2009) original analysis, the edited volume contributes its final chapter to a theoretical analysis. Pete Bennett (2013, p. 146) cites from Barthes to remind us, once again, that myth (or myth today) is « 'a double system', a value for which truth is no guarantor; 'nothing prevents it from being a powerful alibi'» (Barthes 1972, p. 122).

We will discuss the double system later, but the significance of myth today and its way of dealing with «truth» allows me to tag the myths as explored by Barthes as not-fake. Myths, as speech, are omnipresent in today's society. However, not-fake does *not* necessarily mean real because truth «is no guarantor». The myth *can* be real – it can be a speech about some real thing, but there is always more to it. For the audience of myths, it does not matter whether the speech is real or not; either way, they can understand the representation, which makes a myth something «by which a culture explains or understands some aspect of reality or nature» (Fiske, 1990, p. 88). This concept of modern myth is a precondition for following the discussion drawing on insights from Translation Studies.

4. MYTHOLOGY AND SIGNS

4.1. A semiology structure: Saussure, Hjelmslev, and Barthes

When myth is regarded as a semiological system, the complexity of how signs work in this system can be identified. Barthes's *Mythologies* – and his theorization on semiology as a whole (see Barthes, 1977a) – is inspired by Louis Hjelmslev (1899-1965) (1963), who further develops Saussure's dyadic sign system of language. According to Hjelmslev, there is a two-level representation of linguistic signs, governed by different logic. The first level sees language as denotative semiotic, representing the relationship between conceptual order (what Hjelmslev [1963, p. 114] calls «content») and phonic order (expression). Such a relationship immediately becomes the expression of a second-level representation: the connotative semiotic.

Barthes develops from Hjelmslev and extends the focus of semiology beyond language. He comments that «[s]emiology is therefore perhaps destined to be absorbed into a trans-linguistics, the materials of which may be myth, narrative, journalism, or on the other hand objects of our civilization, in so far as they are spoken» (Barthes 1977a, p. 11). To construct the structure of myth today, Barthes (2009, pp. 133-140) replicates Hjelmslev's double-level structure, where the sign of signified and signifier, following Saussure's tradition, of the first level (language) becomes the signifier of the second, and «sign», as the third element in Saussure's semiological system, is an element that indicates a correlation between the signified and signifier.

He points out that it is this third element that «knows only one operation: reading and deciphering» (ibid., p. 113). Because of Barthes's ambition of extending the range of semiology beyond language-as-a-sign, he similarly considers speech beyond linguistic ones in his exploration of myth, where he (Barthes, 2009, p. 132) comments: «not only written discourse but also photography, cinema, reporting, sport, shows, publicity, all these can serve as a support to mythical speech», which is arguably what is seen in the development of Translation Studies currently – but we will come back to the issue of translation in this later.

Because the signified – the sign system of the first level, or rather, the sign itself – is full, myth deprives the sign of fullness, making it an empty

signifier in the second level, a «form». The form is next associated with the signified in the second level, the 'concept' of the myth; the myth then becomes another sign system and is full again.

There is a two-fold nature to the concept that fulfils the empty form: intentional and historical. On the one hand, to say that the concept of myth is intentional means that not every sign of language is deprived of meaning by myth. Rather, myth selects some of those signs on purpose. There is intention behind the myth, «the fundamental character of the mythical concept is to be *appropriated*» (Barthes, 2009, p. 143). There is a certain function – or «tendency», as Barthes (idem) calls it – for the concept to perform, and there are target audiences for the myth. On the other hand, being historical means that myth stems from history.

When becoming the form, the sign has already lost historical significance on the first level because of its emptiness. Such loss does not mean death; instead, the meaning of the first-level sign that «contained a whole system of values» (ibid., p. 141), including history, serves as nourishment for the myth. Nourished by the meaning, concept gives the myth a new history. The first-level sign that is turned into myth often distances itself from the meaning – the system of values – concealing the original history.

4.2. Semiotic mythology: From Peirce to Eco

Considering a mythology system from semiology provide fruitful theoretical insights, but there are some missing aspects. A dyadic semiology system does not elaborate on the reasons behind the dynamics of sign interpretation; the arbitrariness of the link between signified and signifier is largely taken for granted. Even though Saussure specifically wrote about arbitrariness in language, his writing feels more descriptive than reflective. In other words, following the semiological tradition, Barthes's theory reveals the «whats» of myths today, namely, what ideological and historical connotations are hidden beneath the naturalness. A search for theorizing the «how» of the myths needs further exploration.

In this case, Peirce's triadic system of semiotics may offer further insights. Peirce's triadic system of semiotics involves a sign consisting of a representamen (the form of the sign), an object (what the sign refers to), and an interpretant (the understanding or mental effect produced by the sign). Peirce's definition of a sign highlights that a sign is «something which stands to somebody for something in some respect or capacity. It

addresses somebody, that is, creates in the mind of that person an equivalent sign, or perhaps a more developed sign. That sign which it creates I call the interpretant of the first sign. The sign stands for something, its object» (2.228). The process of semiosis, or the action of the sign, involves *Firstness* (the quality or possibility), *Secondness* (the fact or existence), and *Thirdness* (the law or habit that connects the sign to its object through the interpretant). In this process, the interpretant can generate a new representamen, leading to an ongoing cycle of interpretation – the infinite semiosis.

The dynamics of semiosis and the cycle of interpretation, is important for considering the «how» issues in the representation and interpretation of myth. One way of applying the dynamics of semiotics to Barthes's mythology comes from what Umberto Eco (1932-2016) (1986, 68) calls an «encyclopedic» representation, the core concept Eco develops in order to «combine C. S. Peirce's pragmatic and interpretative semiotic theory with the semantic and structuralist theory by Louis Hjelmslev» (Lorusso, 2015, p. 122); the latter, again, is what inspires Barthes's *Mythologies*. As Lorusso (ibid., p. 39) observes, Barthes's theorization of code can indeed be seen as «a portion of an 'encyclopedia', to borrow a key term from Eco».

From Eco's perspective, an encyclopedic representation «marks the transformation of the code from a rule that defines signification and interpretation, into the idea of a system of possible inferences, in which even a principle of choice, of freedom, or of interpretation may find a place» (Violi, 1992, p. 99, translated and cited in Lorusso, 2015, p. 121). The key idea behind encyclopedic representation is that interpreters draw from previous knowledge or «pre-existing frames» (Eco, 1986, p. 72). To interpret a sign, therefore, is to see that sign as a node linking to previous encyclopedic knowledge. In other words, an encyclopedic representation allows for a multi-dimensional model of meaning-making, which aligns with the principles underlying Model Q, as described in *A Theory of Semiotics* (Eco, 1976, pp. 121-125).

In Model Q, meaning is generated through the interaction of various elements within a semiotic system, where interpretation is contingent on context, codes, and the interpreter's knowledge. Similarly, the concept of encyclopedic representation emphasizes that interpreters draw from an interconnected network of previous knowledge or «pre-existing frames» (Eco, 1986, p. 72) to understand a sign. This shared emphasis on the fluidity and complexity of meaning-making highlights how interpretation

in an encyclopedic framework involves navigating a rich and dynamic network of associations, leading to a potentially infinite process of semiosis, as each interpretation opens up new connections within this vast web of knowledge. In short, encyclopedic representation is a rhizome model of knowledge that «connects any point to any other point, and its traits are not necessarily linked to traits of the same nature; it brings into play very different regimes of signs» (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987, p. 21).

Representation based on a rhizome model is inference in nature. This means that the meaning of a sign is only derived from the inference of past knowledge and, when necessary, the rhizomes of knowledge from those experiences. In this regard, Eco's encyclopedia brings a new reflection on Barthes's structure to the discussion of mythology. Barthes's double-level sign system may seem to suggest that, according to Eco (1986, p. 33), «the first level may still be based on equivalence, while the second is doubtlessly based on inference».

On the second level, the representation relationship is clearly inferential and depends on the frames of encyclopedic representation for meaning. However, according to Eco (1986, 36), even if the first level is based on the equivalence logic, «equivalence appears to be a 'sleeping' inference here as well», and «therefore, there is no difference in the semiotic structure of first- and second- level significance».

In short, Eco's encyclopedia provides a more dynamic framework in theoretically understanding how the semiotic structure of myth works and allows us integrating the Saussurean semiology that underlies Barthes's mythological system with Peirce's triadic system of semiotics. In doing so, we gain a deeper insight into the «how»: the fluid and dynamic processes that govern the interpretation of myths. Through the lens of encyclopedic representation, modern myths become a living, evolving construct, where each sign, despite being on the first level or second level, is interpreted within a vast, interconnected network of knowledge and experiences.

This interpretative process is inherently inferential, allowing for the continuous reinterpretation and renegotiation of meaning as new contexts and knowledge emerge. Thus, Eco and Peirce together offer a framework for understanding not only the structure of myths but also the processes that fuel their perpetuation and evolution, highlighting the active role of interpretation in shaping the myths that inform our cultural consciousness.

5. Representation, myth, and translation

Translation lies at the core of the encyclopedic construction of myth. It is rather obvious that the transformation of a semiological system from language into the form of myth – the constant campaign of emptying the first-level sign and refilling it with mythical signified – is translational. In order to understand how translation empties a sign, the Peircean triadic semiotic system comes into play. Consider the following statement:

> Translation is semiosis. It takes as its point of departure the verbal sign as referring to its object. Tracing back the particular way in which a sign is encoded is followed by the creation, in the mind, of an interpretant, the meaning of which is equivalent to, or a more developed version of, the meaning of the first sign. This interpretant also becomes a sign, which is the starting point of a second triadic relation (Gorlée, 2013, p. 106).

Translation, as semiosis, constantly works to create meaning based on a first sign. Along the way, translation deprives the first sign of its meaning but the meaning, like in a myth, does not die. Instead, it simply nourishes the generated meaning as an interpretant, which is regarded as an equivalent or better alternative. The translation process does not end there. The interpretant immediately becomes another sign, waiting to be caught by translation, and its meaning is transferred again. Similarly, George Steiner's proposal of translation considers a four-stage hermeneutic motion. A translator, in a movement of aggression, «invades, extracts, and brings home». Then, in the next movement, incorporates – that is, dislocates and relocates (Steiner 1975, pp. 198-199). In short, translation constantly deprives one sign of its meaning and creates meaning in another sign. While myth steals meaning from language – or any sign – as the first-level sign, making the empty form fulfilled again on the second level, translation is the core of the emptying and fulfilling.

The idea of translation providing a better alternative deserves further consideration. As previously noted, Peirce holds a similar belief that the interpretant – the sign translation – always brings something new to the sign or, in Gorlée's words, «thoughts may grow through translation» (Gorlée, 1994, p. 125). The change translation brings is echoed by translation scholars. For example, Piotr Blumczynski (2016, p. 346) states that «there is definitely something wrong (…) with *untranslated* victories,

selves, and discoveries. Only when translated do they reach the full extent of their value». Blumczynski is talking about translating a word into an action, but the same holds true when a denotative sign is translated into a connotative myth, and the sign becomes more complete and has more value. As interpreters generate an encyclopedic interpretation of the myth sign, representation continues to become transparent. A totally transparent sign is no longer a sign because it says nothing more than itself; in other words, it becomes the truth. Only then does translation reach its final destiny – the final interpretant. This, of course, is an ideal status. Again, as Blumczynski (idem) claims, translation «breaks the spell of the proverbial good intentions and brings things to completion (though it is rarely complete itself)».

Next, consider Barthes's discussion of *concept* in myth and its natures, specifically the intention and history of *concept.* To identify the intentionality of concept in a myth system, a discussion of source text translatability must ask «whether by its very essence it allows itself to be translated, and hence – in accord with the meaning of this mode – also calls for translation» and «whether the translation of certain linguistic construction is required» (Benjamin, 1997, pp. 152-153).

Understood in this way, translatability is «essential to certain works» where «a specific significance inherent in the original texts expresses itself in their translatability» (idem). In this regard, a source text chooses – or «calls for» – the translator, much as translator chooses the text. On the one hand, some translators are controlled by means of «official appointment, censorship, credentialing processes, state oversight of translation, or effacement or enforcement of cultural ideologies through official translation protocols» (Tymoczko, 2006, p. 452). On the other hand, other activist translators translate for «cultural nationalism (including the creation of national literatures), self-determination of their peoples, and national independence» (ibid., p. 454). In either case, translation takes place for a purpose.

After the discussion of intentionality, the question is how does translation make the concept of myth historical? To start, translation happens within a dynamic system – a polysystem (Even-Zohar, 1979, pp. 287-310). It considers a static system but also, perhaps more importantly, shifts from central to peripheral, from past to present. History, in this case, is carried with the translation and brought to the present. The afterlife of a work of literature is an example of how history is presented to readers by

means of translation. Translation always comes after the source text (Benjamin, 1997, p. 153) and once translation takes place, it at once becomes the afterlife of the source text, bringing history to the reader but not the original history – a history described by translation, a whole new history of the target text. Aside from the discussion of afterlife, there is more to translation and history. Tejaswini Niranjana (1992, pp. 88-89) regards translation as the practice of forgetting: «a translation that involves 'citation' rather than 'absolute forgetting,' that indicates not a simple rupture with the past but a radical rewriting of it».

She goes on to say that translation is a «transactive reading», practiced «between past and future» (idem). In other words, history has no single truth but, rather, «history is a process without a telos or a subject… a reputation of … master narratives and their twin categories of narrative closure (telos) and of character (subject of history)» (Jameson, 1981, p. 29). Understanding history in this way to understand that translation shifts historical narratives – to translate history means to «disturb or displace» that history (Niranjana, p. 38). In this regard, translation often takes a historical narrative and makes it anew. Similarly, the concept of myth robs language of its history and endows it with a new one.

6. ICONIC AND SYMBOLIC CONSTRUCTION OF MYTHS

To further illustrate the functionality of translation in constructing/revealing modern myths, this section demonstrates a case study of a poster promoting the Trinity Centre for Asian Studies titled «How is Trinity Preparing Ireland for the Asian Century» (see Figure 1). The poster shows a photograph of the Convention Centre Dublin by the Liffey River. The reflection of the Convention Centre on the water is a traditional Chinese building, with red pillars and a tile rooftop. The poster's text – the linguistic signs – will not be discussed apart from the title, because, methodologically, critical discourse analysis in Translation Studies has been used for so long that it is no longer innovative in any means to apply it again here. The element that is most relevant for this analysis is the image as myth. While the paper mainly focuses on the myth of the picture of the Chinese style of architecture, it is important to compare how myths are constructed differently between the Chinese one and the Convention Centre.



Figure 1. A poster showing the Convention Centre Dublin and a Chinese building as its reflection. Credit: Trinity Centre for Asian Studies, used with permission.

6.1. Icon-to-symbol myth

First, consider the first representation of the poster image: a building that is representative of Dublin stands along the river – an icon-to-symbol representation, or, in Barthes's terms, a standard denotation-connotation myth structure. This means that the first representation relation is iconic – the representation is based solely on similarity. As previously argued, the similarity that allows the photo of the Convention Centre to represent the concept of the *real* Convention Centre makes the representation a synonymy, the first layer of Barthes's sign system. However, an icon cannot always remain an icon once observed. For those who know the Convention Centre – the frame, as Eco calls it – they see an encyclopedic representation, namely the building's location, functions, history, texture,

etc. The previous knowledge of the interpreters constructs an interpretant who translates «a sign into another system of signs» (Peirce, *Collected Papers*, 4.127). Such interpretation completes the sign as it works in the poster. The photo is no longer a copy of the Convention Centre; it goes beyond the stage of being a repetition of the real world. The photo of the Convention Centre becomes a node in a system of encyclopedic knowledge that is linked in a rhizome fashion. As the photo, or the sign, is translated by interpreters, it becomes more complex and more complete. As Gorlée highlights (1994, p. 123), «signs are evolutionary agents aimed at engendering interpretant signs, which evolve, through time, their informational content». This means that signs evolve via the interpretant or sign translation, and Peirce himself often uses the two terms interchangeably.

Describing the photo of the Convention Centre as an icon-to-symbol representation means that the photo is a replica of the real-world construction by way of similarity. However, the poster is not an icon. Readers interpret the sign, or in Peirce's words, translate the sign, by using it as a hub to connect to an encyclopedic network of previous knowledge, thereby turning it into a symbol. This is when the sign properly conveys meaning to the viewers, representing not only the building, but Ireland.

In other words, the photo «bears an analogous (rather than arbitrary) relationship to its object» (Oxman 2010, p. 74). However, no photography can be innocent from ideological connotation, which immediately turns iconicity into symbolicity. Therefore, the recognition of the symbolic representation relationship – as a way of demystifying photography – depends largely on the first-hand experience of the interpreter, meaning the first-hand experience of going to Dublin, seeing the building, and recognizing it afterwards. In other words, there is nothing particularly Irish about this building other than its location. Only those who know the building as it is understand the symbolic relationship. For people without Irish knowledge, unfortunately, the myth speaks little other than a modern building.

Before we turn to the representations of the reflection in the water, there is every need to acknowledge the limitation of the analysis in this section. I focus mainly on how the ideology of «Irishness» is coded into the image of the Conference Centre, while arguably some other ideological coding is ignored (for instance, modernity vs. tradition; West vs. East etc.). While revising the paper, I accidentally ran into another building in China (see Figure 2). Its resemblance to the Conventional Centre, namely, a glass

curtain wall system that forms a curvilinear form, makes the above analysis, with emphasis on the Irishness, even more relevant. The two buildings, while, of course, there are architectural and aesthetic differences, share similarities that require analysis for another mythological analysis, the important feature for me here is how specific Irish knowledge works as central element in reading the sign of Irishness, and why it is important to, first, recognize the image of Conventional Building as an icon. In short, there are plenty of potential to further demystify this representation, but my current analysis focuses solely on Irishness.



Figure 2. A similar glass curvilinear structured building in China. The photo is taken by the author.

6.2. Symbol as modern myth

The denotative-connotative logic is not entirely true for the photo of the Chinese building. It is likely that most people do not know the name of that building or even its location – therefore not an analogous sign of any specific object in the eyes of the audience. Nevertheless, the unfamiliarity does not impede the viewers from still identifying the building as representing China. The photo still starts out as an icon, possibly resembling a specific building,[2] but even before anyone sees the poster, the icon was already translated into a symbol. To say it starts out as an icon is analyzing this photo in a similar way to the photo of the Conventional Centre. However, what is different is that it soon becomes an encyclopedic entry, referring to representations of Chinese architecture. The photo represents not the building itself but a stereotype. This shift in representation makes it more of a symbol than an icon.

This means that without knowing exactly which building it is, viewers can still recognize the object – the immediate object – this representamen conveys. Now the sign is a symbol, but not exactly the symbol that functions on the poster. To serve the purpose of the poster, the sign requires further interpreting by the viewers into a new sign. This means that this sign has been translated not twice, but at least three times: first, from real architecture to icon by synonymy; second, from icon to symbol of a stereotype of Chinese architecture by inference; and third, from one symbol to another symbol, connected again by inference. The module of Barthes's mythology becomes more complicated as it goes from a double-level sign system to a triple-level sign system.

There are several things worth highlighting about this process. The first is how China is mystified. In Michel Foucault's (1926-1984) *The Order of Things* (2002), he borrows Jorge Luis Borges's (1899-1986) Chinese encyclopedia as evidence to claim that:

> In our dreamworld, is not China precisely this privileged site of space? ... In our traditional imagery, the Chinese culture is the most meticulous, the most rigidly ordered, the one most deaf to temporal events, most attached to the pure delineation of space; we think of it as a civilization of dikes and dams beneath the eternal face of the sky; we see it, spread and frozen, over the

[2] The development of Generative Artificial Intelligence may even exclude the possibility and making a fictive building image that still resonate with the photo in question and symbolically represents China.

> entire surface of a continent surrounded by walls (Foucault, 2002, pp. xx-xxi).

The seemingly absurd claim aims to show how different cultures may have different ways of categorization and ordering from Western logic. Relevant to our analysis, it also shows that China is imagined as the cultural other, the one the West uses not only to know the Chinese but also to know themselves. Longxi Zhang (2005) marks this as a myth of otherness and tries to find ways to *break* it (note that he is not set to *demystify* it as Barthes does and arguably using the term myth in the «not-real» fashion). He claims that myth brings charm and fear, with the fear creating even more space between the self and the other. Only by recognizing the real differences, rather than the imagined ones, can the myth be debunked. However, a myth can never be totally debunked. In this case, myth is a translation of a specific space and culture that is alien to another cultural group, in this case, Ireland. Again, using Eco's term, to see myth as a multilevel sign system, the other links the sign of myth to previous encyclopedic knowledge. The viewers may have heard of Chinese architecture or even have seen it for themselves. They may already know, from whatever source, Chinese people or attempt to get to know them. The same can be said about Chinese culture, politics, landscape, and, in Borges's case, creatures. When viewers see this sign on the poster, all this knowledge is linked to the sign, making it a node that connects to the past.

The second thing worth highlighting is the process by which an architecture icon becomes stereotypical symbol. For the Convention Centre Dublin, there is nothing Irish about it except for the location. For the Chinese architecture, everything about it is Chinese except for the location. This article is not suggesting in any way that the building is not in China, but it does not really matter if it is or not. Consider, for instance, the Chinatown in London or anywhere else in the world, where a Chinese-style plaque works more or less the same way as the photo on the poster. Even if contemporary China constructs an overwhelming number of modern buildings with reinforced concrete, the prevailing semiotic shorthand for a 'Chinese building' remains consistent with the traditional imagery presented in this poster – what is referred to as not-fake. There is no denying that the type of building on the poster is located in China but regardless, it is still largely a myth of the Far East.

To a large extent, China is a myth of otherness to the West, which means that most people lack first-hand knowledge, depending on stereotypes to know the place. As a result, a sign that used to be an icon is turned into a symbol of the stereotype, and that meaning is conveyed to the interpreters. The poster uses this sign, which has already become a stereotypical symbol, to create a myth about China – a not-fake myth, a myth of modern times. To view this picture within Barthes's model, the first level of the sign system is already inference, before another inference representation (or interpretant, or sign translation) empties the first sign and refills it with new representamen.

More importantly, the myth is not completed by the image alone but by anchorage – where «the text directs the reader through the signifieds of the image, causing him to avoid some and receive others» (Barthes, 1977b, pp. 40-41, see also Trifonas [2001] for a discussion on Barthes's anchorage and relay). The caption on the poster, «Preparing Ireland for the Asian Century», forces the viewer to interpret the reflection not as a mere optical illusion, but as a translation of Irish space into Asian symbol. In this sense, rather than treating the Convention Centre and the Chinese architecture as isolated signs, the boundary that connects them, that is, the water surface, becomes the translational zone. In other words, the real-world Irish architecture casts a reflection of an Asian building guided by the linguistic representation. The reflection, therefore, becomes a translation: it mystifies the physicality of the Dublin building into the mythology of a prototypical Chinese building. This act of visual mystification maps the mythological semiotic process where the signifier (the building) is emptied of its literal geography and refilled with a geopolitical concept of the Asian Century.

In short, by reflecting on both architectural images on the poster, two different types of representation emerge: one that is based on people's knowledge about a particular building, so as to represent the geographic location – Ireland – where the building is based. The way representation works in this case comes from the firstness: the looking-alike of a specific object. However, the other image represents the location of China by ways of symbolic interpretation: While the exact location of the building can be anywhere in the world (similar architecture can be found in Chinatown in London, for example), the architectural style itself becomes the myth of China. Moreover, rather than simply presenting two contrasting types of representation, the poster presents in front of us a translational *process*. The Convention Centre that operates on Peircean firstness *is translated by*

its reflection into the symbolic myth of China. As an architectural stereotype, it is deprived of geographic specification and anchored by the poster as the mythology of Asia. Building on this spatial and semiotic translation, the next section further explores how such constructed myths, in turn, actively shape and translate our social reality.

7. MYTHS TODAY AS TRANSLATING REALITY

Introducing translation into the understanding of myths allows us to explore what this paper promises at the beginning, that it points to how myths shape the social/cultural reality. Bradley Gorham (1999) has built up a useful framework between myth and memory, in which he interlinks myth with social reality. The framework goes:

> (1) With repeated exposure, automaticity between certain signs and certain myths will develop; and (2) since automatically primed contexts are available for subsequent processing, myths will affect the processing of subsequent information (Gorham 1999, p. 237).

Gorham's remarks are related to how racial stereotypes are produced and reproduced via media as myths; the framework can be applied in our case. Stereotype is already raised as an issue of exploration in the previous analysis: While the stereotype tells the viewer little about China, apart from the expectation that some of those buildings can be seen there, the translated myth on the poster allows viewers to connect their previous knowledge – and re-enhance such knowledge – about China to this hub. However, the question remains about how does myth influence reality, especially based on the framework mentioned above? To answer in Gorham's own words, social reality (of stereotype) is constructed by «automatically priming racial stereotype congruent interpretations of subsequent media texts (in other words, myths), and by doing so repeatedly and consistently».

This is indeed what happens with so-called Chinese architecture as myths – the wooden buildings with *pointed* (that is, diagonal, axonometric, curvilinear) perspectives and the tile ceiling somehow become the equivalent of the concept of China.[3] To validate that this translational myth

[3] I would like to thank an earlier reviewer of this manuscript for bringing this to my attention.

extends beyond posters, consider the wide use of such imagery in travel vlogs (see Figure 3). Here, the traditional Chinese roof is employed as a thumbnail – arguably, a translational metonymy. The video content might feature skyscrapers or subways, yet the thumbnail constantly constructs a social reality to drag the entire country back into this mythical architectural stereotype.




Figure 3. Thumbnails of some China travel vlogs featuring the «Chinese architectural style»

The re-production of the social reality (China ≡ wooden pointed architecture) is translational in several aspects. Quite obviously, the logic of A ≡ B here is one of the classic models of translation: that of equivalence. Of course, what Translation Studies actually does is claim that equivalence is not an equation. On the contrary, linking A and B with the equation, that is, simplifying the representational relationship as a denotative one, hides the historical and ideological complexities (the connotative / mythical representations) in the relationship between signs and objects. Not realizing the complexities and reproducing the equation can be dangerous. Ye Tian (2023), for example, provides an analysis of such danger from the perspective of hermeneutics, where, again inspired by Barthes (1977b), translation figuratively kills the author. In mythological language, Barthes (2009, p.169) states the same relationship between myth and reality: «The function of myth is to empty reality: it is, literally, a ceaseless flowing out, a hemorrhage, or perhaps evaporation, in short a perceptible absence». In other words, in a translational perspective, if the differences between equivalence and equation lie in the fact that «translation changes everything» (Venuti, 2012), the change translation brings is to deconstruct and reconstruct the social reality as myths. The repetitive visual translation on digital media acts as what Gorham (1999) calls an «automatic prime», consistently reinforcing the imposed equivalence, serving as a persistent semiotic strategy in reconstructing the social reality of China, or, the Asian Century.

Another relationship between myth and reality is that «we cannot manage to achieve more than an unstable grasp of reality doubtless» (Barthes, 2009, p. 187). Mythology, therefore, allows us to seek «a reconciliation between reality and men, between description and explanation, between object and knowledge». The inability to have a comprehensive and firm grasp of reality is, again, translational: what is (re)issued in translation is always pieces of the shards of the broken vase of «pure language» (Benjamin, 1997, p. 157). Translation, at the same time, creates the instability described by Barthes and allows the reconciliation.

8. CONCLUSION

Myths today are semiotic constructions. While Fiske (1990, p. 87) says that he wishes «Barthes had not used» the term «myth», the term

inspires this paper to view «not-fake» representations as modern myths: representations that are not necessarily fake but are also not necessarily the «truth». In the hope of revealing the history that modern myth naturalized in everyday signs, Barthes identifies a double-level dyadic sign system, with the top level (connotative semiotic) emptying the bottom one (denotative semiotic) and refiling it with another signified. Considering Peirce's semiotics allows the dyadic system to develop into a triadic system, making the sign system more dynamic. This paper reveals the power of translation in analyzing the myths today. Translation as an encyclopedic representation is the fundamental reason that myths can become myths, and, eventually, makes it the useful tool to demystify them. Going a step further, translation not only works within the myth system, but myth *is* translation. The myth constructors translate their encyclopedic network of knowledge into myth, while interpreters rely on their own encyclopedic network of knowledge to decipher myth. To this end, myth becomes the translation of social reality, and, by re-producing itself, it continues to construct the social reality. Translation, as fragmented vase pieces of pure language, constantly allows and reveals such an operation.

REFERENCES

Barthes, Roland (1977a). *Elements of Semiology* (Trans. Annette Lavers and Colin Smith). Hill and Wang.

Barthes, Roland (1977b). *Image-Music-Text* (Trans. Stephen Heath). Fontana Press.

Barthes, Roland (2009). *Mythologies* (Trans. Annette Lavers). Vintage Books.

Benjamin, Walter (1997). The translator's task (Trans. Steven Rendall). *Traduction, Terminologie, Rédaction*, 10 (2), 151-165. https://doi.org/10.7202/037302ar

Bennett, Pete and Julian McDougall (2013). *Barthes'* Mythologies *Today: Readings of Contemporary Culture*. Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203568422

Blumczynski, Piotr (2016). *Ubiquitous Translation*. LRoutledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315646480 ; https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315646480-1

Blumczynski, Piotr (2023). *Experiencing Translationality: Material and Metaphorical Journeys*. Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003382201

Carbonell Cortés, Ovidi (2006). Misquoted Others: Locating newness and authority in cultural translation. In Theo Hermans (Ed.), *Translating Others* (Vol. 1, pp. 43-63). Routledge.

Cassirer, Ernst (1946). *Language and Myth* (Trans. Susanne K. Langer). Dover Publications.

Deleuze, Gilles and Guattari, Félix (1987). *A Thousand Plateaus*. The Athlone Press.

Derrida, Jacques (1985). Des Tours de Babel (Trans. Joseph F. Graham). In Joseph F. Graham (Ed.), *Difference in Translation* (pp. 165-107). Cornell University Press.

Eco, Umberto (1976). *A Theory of Semiotics*.Indiana University Press. https://doi.org/10.2979/3140.0 ; https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-15849-2

Eco, Umberto (1986). *Semiotics and the Philosophy of Language*.Indiana University Press. https://doi.org/10.2979/ 2919.0

Even-Zohar, Itamar (1979). Polysystem theory. *Poetics Today*, 1 (1/2), 287-310. https://doi.org/10.2307/1772051

Fiske, John (1990). *Introduction to Communication Studies*.Routledge.

Foucault, Michel (2002). *The Order of Things*. Routledge.

Freud, Sigmund (1925). Some psychological consequences of the anatomical distinction between the sexes. *Standard Edition*, 19, 248-258.

Gorham, Bradley W. (1999). Stereotypes in the media: So what? *Howard Journal of Communications* , 10 (4), 229-247. https://doi.org/10.1080/106461799246735

Gorlée, Dinda L. (1994). *Semiotics and the Problem of Translation: With Special Reference to the Semiotics of Charles S. Peirce*. Rodopi. https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004454750

Hjelmslev, Louis (1963). *Prolegomena to a Theory of Language* (Trans. Francis J. Whitfield). University of Wisconsin Press.

Howells, Richard (1999). *The Myth of the Titanic*. St. Martin's Press. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230510845_3 ; https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230510845

Jameson, Fedric (1981). *The Political Unconscious: Narrative as a Socially Symbolic Act*. Methuen.

Lévi-Strauss, Claude (1963). *Structural Anthropology* (Trans. Claire Jacobson and Brooke Grundfest Schoepf). Basic Books.

Lévi-Strauss, Claude (2001). *Myth and Meaning*. Routledge.

Lorusso, Anna Maria (2015). *Cultural Semiotics: For a Cultural Perspective in Semiotics*. Palgrave Macmillan. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137546999

Lotman, Juri M. and Boris A. Uspensky (1978). Myth — Name — Culture. *Semiotica*, 22 (3-4), 211-234. https://doi.org/10.1515/semi.1978.22.3-4.211

Lotman, Juri M. (1990). *Universe of the Mind: A Semiotic Theory of Culture* (Trans. Ann Shukman). I. B. Tauris.

Marais, Kobus (2018). *A (Bio)Semiotic Theory of Translation: The Emergence of Social-Cultural Reality*. Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315142319

Midgley, Mary (2003). *The Myths We Live By*. Routledge.

Niranjana, Tejaswini (1992). *Siting Translation: History, Post-Structuralism, and the Colonial Context*. University of California Press. https://doi.org/10.1525/9780520911369

Peirce, Charles Sanders (1994). *The Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce*. Ed. Charles Hartshorne, Paul Weiss, and Arthur Burks. Thoemmes Continuum.

Pizzato, Mark (2024). *European Churches and Chinese Temples as Neuro-Theatrical Sites*. Bloomsbury. https://doi.org/10.5040/9798765109144

Steiner, George (1975). *After Babel: Aspects of Language and Translation*. Oxford University Press

Trifonas, Peter Pericles (2001). *Barthes and the Empire of Signs*. Icon.

Tian, Ye (2023). The dangers of translation: Readings and re-presentations of a Chinese internet celebrity. *New Voices in Translation Studies*, 28 (2), pp. 78-102. https://doi.org/10.14456/nvts.2023.28

Tymoczko, Maria (2006). Translation: Ethics, ideology, action. *The Massachusetts Review*, 47 (3), pp. 442-461.

Tymoczko, Maria (2007). *Enlarging Translation, Empowering Translators*. St Jerome.

Venuti, Lawrence (2012). *Translation Changes Everything: Theory and Practice*. Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203074428

White, Hayden (1973). *Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth Century Europe*. Johns Hopkins University Press.

Zhang, Longxi (2005). *中西文化十论* (*Zhong Xi Wenhua Shi Lun) [Ten articles on Chinese and Western cultural studies in the Chinese language]*. Fudan University Press.

Marais, Kobus (2021). Eleven different names, one practice: Towards a phenomenology of translation. *Perspectives*, 29 (3), 311-325. https://doi.org/10.1080/0907676X.2020.1726419