Cuerpo humano, mejora y la virtud tecnomoral perdida

  • Marco Stango Juniata College
  • David W Agler Pennsylvania State University

Resumen

En este artículo evaluamos dos lados del debate sobre la mejora biomédica. Primero, la idea de que la mejora biomédica debería prohibirse sobre la base de que degrada la naturaleza humana; segundo, que la mejora biomédica puede, en principio, eliminar la fuente del mal moral. Al hacerlo, propondremos una noción diferente de la naturaleza humana, lo que llamaremos la idea agato-teleológica de la naturaleza humana, y sus implicaciones para una comprensión filosófica del cuerpo humano. Además, señalaremos por qué no parece razonable pensar que la mejora corporal sea suficiente para garantizar el progreso moral. Finalmente, propondremos la idea de que nuestras sociedades tecnológicas necesitan una nueva virtud moral, lo que llamaremos la virtud de la integridad corporal no conservadora.

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Publicado
15/01/2018
Cómo citar
STANGO, Marco; AGLER, David W. Cuerpo humano, mejora y la virtud tecnomoral perdida. Sociología y Tecnociencia, [S.l.], v. 8, n. 1, p. 43-59, jan. 2018. ISSN 1989-8487. Disponible en: <https://revistas.uva.es/index.php/sociotecno/article/view/1707>. Fecha de acceso: 21 june 2018